Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Wilson,G/Schpall,S, Panaetius and Hans-Georg Gadamer

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21 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22333 Only language is understandable Being [Gadamer]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
20928 Facts don't oppose values; they are integrated into each person's aspirations [Gadamer, by Zimmermann,J]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
6012 We must choose in which of the virtues we wish to excel [Panaetius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
6013 Panaetius said we should live according to our natural starting-points [Panaetius, by Asmis]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
6014 Panaetius identified courage with great-mindedness, preferring civic courage to military [Panaetius, by Asmis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
5888 Souls are born, since they are sensitive and inherited, so they must perish [Panaetius, by Cicero]